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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Petitioner and Appellee Deanna Pugh, pro se, certifies this Petition
for Rehearing is submitted in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
I hereby submit the following arguments and facts for this Court's review
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Respondent and Appellant Dr. Dozzo-Hughes ("Wife") bases her
case to disinter my son, Curtis Hughes, upon a statement in a note my son
left to me, his mother. Dr. Dozzo-Hughes, however, gave testimony at the
trial court level challenging the authenticity of the very note that she relies
upon to disinter my son. In addition, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes acknowledged that
the very wish she seeks to fulfill cannot legally be honored. This Court
remanded the case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to
basically determine whether waiver occurred in this case, noting that neither
party challenged the authenticity of the note. It is my argument that waiver
is immaterial in this case because the wish the widow seeks to accomplish
cannot legally be performed nor is it compelling to disturb my son's remains
upon a note the proponent herself believes has been altered. The basic
determining factor in every exhumation case is that there must be a
compelling reason to disinter. Dr. Dozzo-Hughes does not provide a

compelling reason to disinter; therefore, the issue of waiver is immaterial in
this case.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. I: The Proponent of the Note, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes, Did in
Fact Challenge the Authenticity of the Note.
This Court, in its opinion filed on May 5,2005, under Footnote 2,
stated: "On appeal, the parties do not dispute the Note's Authenticity."
This Court, under paragraph 25, also stated the following: "Furthermore,
even though the trial court was required to assume that the Note contained
Decedent's wishes, it ruled that the Note was 'not material' to its decision,
stating '[Wife]' has not given evidence that the [N]ote creates a binding,
enforceable legal obligation to accomplish a cremation.'"
I now petition this Court to review the trial court's ruling and this
Court's own ruling with the specific knowledge that Dr. Dozzo-Hughes
herself testified that she doubts the authenticity of the Note and that this
information was presented to this Court on appeal in my Brief of Appellee
as well as at the oral argument. In the Brief of Appellee, on page 6, under
"Statement of the Case," and again on p. 32, under "Issue No. 5," it was
brought to this Court's attention that Dr. Dozzo-Hughes challenged the
authenticity of the note. In fact, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes gave the following
testimony at her deposition taken on January 31,2003:
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"[BYMR.FARRIS:]
Q. Do you have any doubt as to the authenticity of
this Exhibit 1, this letter?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What do you doubt about it? You don't think
Curtis authored it?
A. I believe that this handwriting here is
Curtis', but when you look at the typeset and the
different fonts and things like that, I believe the
note has been altered. But because I was not
allowed to read the note in full, I don't know
what might have been altered.
(See attached Addendum A-1, condensed pages 122-125 ofDeposition of
Dr. Dozzo-Hughes taken on January SI, 2003, highlighting page 123,
line 25, through page 124, lines 1-10; see also Record Index 1196.)
It is my position that Judge Beacham, for purposes of summary
judgment in this case, did view the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to Dr. Dozzo-Hughes. Given
Dr. Dozzo-Hughes' own testimony challenging the authenticity of the note
and testifying that it is her belief that the note has been altered at the trial
court level, as shown in Addendum A-l, this Court and Judge Beacham
have the duty to view the note as not authentic and as a note that has
possibly been altered, based upon the non-moving party's own testimony.
Further, when testimony had been given by the Wife challenging the
authenticity of the note prior to summary judgment, the Wife cannot simply

create new testimony to preclude summary judgment. Under Rule 56(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it states as follows:
" . . . . The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must setforth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
(emphasis added) Again, this Court, under paragraph 25, stated
the following: "Furthermore, even though the trial court was required to
assume that the Note contained Decedent's wishes, it ruled that the Note
was 'not material' to its decision, stating '[Wife] has not given evidence that
the [NJote creates a binding, enforceable legal obligation to accomplish a
cremation.'" Wasn't the trial court required to assume that the Note had
been altered and possibly wasn't even authentic given the Wife's testimony
at her deposition?
The motion for summary judgment presented to Judge Beacham that
ultimately was granted by the trial court made no mention of the note, and
the non-moving party did not provide the trial court with any evidence
suggesting the note was authentic or that the note contained Curtis's wishes.
Had the Wife in her memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment or in her affidavit supporting her memorandum in opposition to
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the motion attached the note and testified to its authenticity, I would have
opposed this evidence by addressing the Wife's deposition testimony
wherein she challenges the authenticity of the note. Judge Beacham in this
case was not presented with the note by the Wife to weigh as material
evidence, but he chose to address the note in his ruling even though neither
party produced it for purposes of supporting or opposing summary
judgment. In addition, for this Court's information, Dr. Dozzo-Hughes'
deposition testimony challenging the authenticity of the note was taken one
month after the evidentiary hearing was conducted by the first trial court
judge, the Honorable James L. Shumate.
How could it be compelling to disinter my son based upon a note
when the proponent of the note challenges its authenticity?
ISSUE NO. II: The Trial Court and Dr. Dozzo-Hughes Acknowledged
That Fulfillment of Curtis's Wishes in the Note Would
Be Illegal in New Mexico and Therefore Dr. DozzoHughes Would Not Be Able to Fulfill His Wish
Legally.
On September 9, 2003, Judge Beacham heard oral argument on both
parties' motions for summary judgment. I now draw this Court's attention
to oral argument made by Mr. William O. Kimball, the Wife's attorney, in
opposition to my motion for summary judgment on September 9, 2003. As
shown on page 68 of Volume II of the transcribed hearing, Mr. Kimball

stated the following: "I know that, in New Mexico, that - 1 don't believe
you can put ashes in the - or at the Rio Grande River. And we'd try to
honor that as much as possible, maybe a cemetery nearby or something to
that effect." (See attached Addendum A-2, with p. 68, lines 2-5,
highlighted; see also Record Index p. 1199.) Judge Beacham, on page 10,
paragraph (e), of his Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment dated
October 28, 2003, points out the following: "Respondent acknowledges
that she cannot fully comply with what she considers Mr. Hughes's wishes
even if the body is disinterred and cremated, because laws governing the
Rio Grande River would prevent her from spreading the ashes there." (See
attached Addendum A-3, Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment dated
October 28, 2003; see also Record Index p. 860.)
Viewing the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the Wife
in this case does not create a compelling reason to disinter my son so that
the Wife can place his ashes in "maybe a cemetery nearby or something to
that effect." If you view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom, the
Wife will have my son's body exhumed and cremated in order to place his
ashes somewhere near the Rio Grande River over three years after burial in
order to comply with a note my son left to me, a note the Wife does not
believe is authentic.
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ISSUE NO. Ill: The Issue of Waiver in This Case is Immaterial Since
the Wish Cannot Be Legally Honored and Therefore
the Note Provides No Compelling Reason To Disinter.
In this case the Honorable G. Rand Beacham was not persuaded that
the Wife had identified any compelling reason to order Mr. Hughes's body
disinterred. In addition, throughout this appeal, the Wife did not
specifically challenge the trial court's determination there was no
compelling reason to disinter but merely challenged the issue of waiver. As
shown in the case of In re Estate of Mover, 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978) and in
all the other exhumation cases throughout the United States, the first and
foremost issue to be considered in cases of disinterment is whether or not a
compelling reason exists to disinter.
While the Utah Supreme Court made an additional determination of
waiver in the Mover case, the majority of exhumation cases do not address
the issue of waiver but merely consider other factors revolving around the
disinterment request, ultimately determining whether or not a compelling
reason exists to disinter. While it is my position waiver occurred in this
case, I argue that it is not necessary to remand this case to factually
determine whether or not waiver occurred. I argue that the law set forth in
the exhumation cases cited in this case by both parties requires a compelling
reason to disinter only. However, if the court were to determine a

compelling reason exists, which this trial court did not, then the issue of
waiver would become paramount to its decision-making process* Waiver is
an important issue to be considered in opposition to disinterment, especially
if there may be a compelling reason to disinter. If, on the other hand, the
deceased's wishes cannot legally be honored or if the person seeking
disinterment offers no compelling reason to disinter, then the issue of
waiver becomes immaterial.
This Court ruled under Footnote 9 as follows: "

However, that

policy has to be considered in relation to the facts to be found by the trial
court after receiving testimony and evidence from the parties." The trial
court received evidence and testimony from the Wife that offered no
compelling reason to disinter. The Wife testified that the note upon which
she relies has been altered and doubts its authenticity, and the Wife also
argues that it is against New Mexico law to spread my son's ashes in the
Rio Grande River and therefore would place his ashes somewhere near
there. If the note had been offered as evidence of mv son's wishes to the
trial court and if the Wife succeeded in proving its authenticity, my son's
wish was not to be exhumed and cremated over three years later, nor was it
my son's wish to have his ashes placed somewhere near the Rio Grande
River. In essence, the Wife is seeking a judicial order to allow her to honor

ft

my son's alleged wishes, to allow her to disobey the law. There is no
compelling reason to disinter; therefore, waiver is an immaterial issue in this
case.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the fact that the Wife testified that she doubts the
authenticity of the note, that she believes the note has been altered, and that
it would be illegal to place my son's cremated remains in the Rio Grande
River, I respectfully request this Court reconsider its remand of this matter
to the trial court for another evidentiary hearing. I respectfully request this
Court reconsider the issue of waiver as it relates to this case, and that this
Court uphold the Honorable G. Rand Beacham's ruling that there is no
compelling reason to disinter my son. Please let him rest in peace.

DATED: June I1/ ,2005.

EANNAPUGH
Petitioner and Appellee Pro Se
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Michael D. Hughes
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187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770
Samuel G. Draper
1240 East 100 South, Suite 10
St. George, Utah 84790
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The Deposition of I^Ke Dozzo-Hugws, PhJX
Taken on 1/31/2003
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bersoimicli," whytbatwassoin^rtantontliatday,
on March 6&, that I cxmldn't get a copy of it
My God, my husband said he loved mc and these
peopk withheld thatfromroe.
Q, You read the second paragraph?
A. Yes.
Q. As^Soiflieie^alsoscm^iiandwi^Hig^a
handwritten-actually,tfwecouMlabdit,there's
a fii^ full paragraph, second fufl paragi^
one-sentence third paragnn^
paragraph, and then some handwriting,
Did you read all of paragraph 2?
A. No.
Q, How far did you get?
A . "Because I love hex so HHICIL" She pointed
She handed this back to me and she pointed at me where
I was to read.
Q. Middte o f the paragraph 2.
A . Yes. And then she took the note awayfromrne
again. I dio^11 read anythir^ arxmt any houses. I
didn^ know anything about anything. Then after she
ripped the note out of my hands the secor^
o^ughter, Stacy, started talking arx>ut the Beck and
Balconhonies,andI^verycoTinisedbecaxiseIhaven^
read this, and the Balcon home was rninebefo^
Pfcgc

I 1 maxrierl
j 2
Q. Tlafs the one you were living in?
13
A. Yes.
14
Q. Ihafs the place where the jumping jack was?
5
A. Yes. So I don't know what Deanna and Stacy are

1
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110
ill
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113
114
115
116
117
118
119
20
121
122
123
124
125

talking about, because I haven^ read tte
soQ, What happens then?
A I beheve that these people are goingtobe
closetome and be hone^ with n« and ^aie with nae
and let rj^ be closetothem and us come together as a
family, because it took this tragedy to finally get us
together. That's what I believed
Q. T i e n dM they leave? Did you leave?
A . They feft the warehouse and went back to Utah.
Q. Steve remains?
A 1 donft remember.
Q. D o yoa have airy—subsequendy,youVehada
chaiKXtoieadfi»a^iEeiiote^ttefe^eoii?e^
A. Yes.
Q. WliemSdyaa first have that opportunity?
A Last summer.
Q. I)o you rememrjexappiOAiniately when?
A. July or August
Q. Doywlnw my riouhtas totfac inHuilprf
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1 1
I 2
13
I 4
j 5
I 6
1 7
I 8
I 9
110
111
112
j 13
114

P*gel24
ibis Exhibit 1, tins letter*
A. Yts,Ido.
Q. What do you doubt about it? You don't dank
Curtis authored it?
A I believe that this handwriting here is
I
Curtis^but when you look at the typeset and the
different fonts and tilings lite
note has been altered But because I was not allowed
to read the note in full, I don^fcooir what migk have
been altered
Q. Have you looked for ~ do you k n o w - - h o w many
computers did you have?
A Tve looked through every c^rnputer that Colitis
had access

to.

j

115 Q. AadfiOTidj 16 A No.
117
Q. Did he have a typewriter?
118
A Idoo^ know. Curtis took many o f his
119 r^longings and gave therntohis family m e m ^
120 Q- Whendidhedothat?
121
A I don11 know.
122
Q. How did you discover that?
123 A. Every once in awhile you go through the house
124 and you notice something's gone.
125
Q, Like?
Jj

I
I
j
I

Page 125

I 1
I 2
J 3
|4

A . A bread maker.
Q. Who has the bread maker?
A. I have no idea.
Q„ Youjust know ifs gone?

j5

A. Ye*.

j 6
I 7
I 8
I 9
j 10
111
112
113
114
115
J16
j 17
118
j 19
120
121
122
123
124
125

I
I
1
I

Q, How do you know it went to his family? What
rnakesyoususrx^ that it wenttohis family?
A, Because rus truck was loaded down with things
and—
Q. Is this the day where Hofiys things were in
the back ofhis truck or is this a d i ^ ^
A Iliere are two trucks, the Budget truck and
CurtisT truck.
Q. W h k h i s t h e t m c k t h a t h e h a d H o U y s
belongings in?
A. His truck.
Q. And youte saying there was bekragings in the
Budget truck?
A. Yes.
Q. When had he loaded those into the Budget truck?
A. I have no idea.
Q. When did you discover he had belongings in the
Budget track?
A. After he died
Q. How did you discover that?

I

32 (Pages 122 to 125)
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SHEET 17
1
2

PAGE 67

finally got a copy of the note from Mrs. Pugh.
Now, they're going to bring up that MR. Pugh, or

/

3
the petitioner, showed part of the note to my dent, which
4
is true, Your Honor. She showed her the first paragraph, or
5
part of thefirstsentence, then yanked the note away and
6
pointed her to a certain section that says, Tlove you,"
7
and there's certain terms regarding my dient
8
Now, shedidnt know he wantedtobe cremated
9
unS she received a copy of the noteduring the summerof
110
2002.
11
THE COURT: Okay. But none of this establishes
12
anyteg^baas for the Courttomake an order regardmg
13
that It explains your client's preference as in the
14
reasons for her current request or current intBition. But
15
that ctoesn't establish herrightto do that Andthafswhy
16
I use the cannon and the Bering Strate idea.
17
MR. KIMBALL: I understand, Your Honor. Theoniy
118
reason I was bringing that up istohelp the Court
119
understand that rny client isnt ddng this out of spite or
20
o n a w l m This is very importanttoher. I n f e c t s
21
beenveryeriKJtkmaitydan^ngtoher. toddy's
22
essentially just tryingtohonor the wishes of her deceased
23
husband, at a great expense. And it's our position, Your
24
Honor, that, under New Mexico law, the respondent can honor
125 to- husband's - her dteceased husband's v^iesforbureif to

if
5
6
J
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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/ S
the extent allowable by the law.
I know that, in New Mexico, that - 1 dont
believe you can put ashes in the - or at the Rio Grande
River. And we'd trytohonor that as much as possible,
maybe a cemetery nearby or something to that effect. Butand they're goingtobring up the Smart case, Your Honor.
In the Smart case, it's completely different than
the present case. This person died, I believe had been \
person, and the dergy person had a (
will. AndsThrwas aware tliatiTirpa^Snwantedtobe
buried a certain way, wanted to be cremated in this case.
And after the death, he didn't exerdse that authority, hewell, its in<fispute still. But he knew of that desire and
he didn't honor it And the court found that the body
shouldn't be interred - it shouldn't be taken out of the
ground again because this person was aware, as the executor,
that the person wanted to be cremated, that the decedent
wantedtobe cremated in the Smart v. Moyer case.
And thafs essentially, besides the statute
enacted on May 5th, 2003, this is the only Utah law that is
renrctely on the subject In this case, it's a spouse frying
to honor the wishes, Your Honor. And, again, she wasnt
aware of what he wanted to take place. She didn't find out
until the summer of 2002 that he wantedtobe cremated and
gxead over a river. And she feels really very wronged,

68
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Your Honor, because that was held backfromher as a spouse. 1
2
THE COURT: Well, let's put something eke on the
3
table. Considering the subject matter, ¥$ difficulttobe
4
indelicate about this but, frankly, this only makes a
5
differencetoyour client There could be no evidence that
6
it matters at alltothe decedent anymore. Itdidatone

7

time, perhaps, but there's not goingtobe any evidence
beyond that
Your dient did what she was satisfied with at the
beginning; now she's not satisfied with it But its really
her own discomfort thafs involved here, isnt it? There's
nothing else at stake.
MR.KIMBALL: Your Honor, the decedents daughter
who is also located in Now Mexico and his ex-wife, who is
somewhat close, also has an interest. And she was named in
here, but she hasnt been part of this litigation process.
But, yeah, they want-they want the bodytoslay
here, Your Honor, the decedents parents, the ablings want
the bodytostay here. However, under statutory lawTHECOURT: Well, but they're not the o n e s tteyrenottheonesto-^iggestingtoerebe-bea
change. Thafs my point. But for your clients discomfort
because of a late-discovered note of some sort, there
wouldn't be anything going on here.
MR. KIMBALL: You're correct, Your Honor. Had she

8
9

10
11

known about his wishes, its our positfon she would have
honored his wishes, as the spouse and as the statute allows
hertodo.
THECOURT: Right
MR. KIMBALL: And so as THECOURT: But shedidnt know about it.

MR. KIMBALL: She didn't
THECOURT: And its hard for metounderstand
what the motivation is, then, to go on. Its simply a "wish

Td have done that." But, jeez, I wish I'd done a lot of
things when I didn't know something that I later learned.

12

We all do that And thafs ailed life. Things happen, we

13
14
15
16
17

deal with them at the time, we later learn more and we look
back and say, "Well, I wish I'd done that differently."
But arent we just dealing with something like
that for your dient?
MR.WMBALL: Its a little more than that, Your

18

Honor. She was deceived. They kept the knowledge from her.

19
20
21
22
23

It was kind of a family conspiracy, its our position, and
thatTHECOURT: Well, what evidence is there of that?
MR. KIMBALL: Well, we haven't got into that
because its still our position, Your Honor, that the law

24
25

allows her to do this as the spouse.
THECOURT: Okay. I see.
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEANNA PUGH,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 020502154
Judge G. Rand Beacham

LESLIE DOZZO-HUGHES, et al,
Respondents.)

This matter came before the Court pursuant to motions for summary judgment filed
by Petitioner Deanna Pugh (hereafter "Petitioner") and Respondent Leslie Dozzo-Hughes
(hereafter "Respondent"). The Court heard oral arguments at a hearing on September 9,
2003, and i&structed the parties thereafter to submit courtesy copies of their memoranda and
affidavits, copies of relevant case law, and a notice to submit for decision. Having read the
memoranda, statutes and case law, having heard the arguments, and having reviewed the file
for this action, the Court rules as follows:
COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4-501
Respondent's motion was filed first. The "Statement of Facts" of Respondent's
supporting memorandum cites only one source: Portions of the "Background" section of
Judge Shumate's May 19,2003 "Ruling onRule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment"
Although Respondent treats the "Background" section as if it consisted of findings of fact,

that is incorrect. The "Background" section appears to tins Court to be simply a recitation
of the allegations relevant to the issues raised by the pleadings. It is particularly telling that
the "Background" statements upon which Respondent relies are irrelevant to Judge
Shumate's actual ruling that the Order Granting Permanent Injunction was vacated.
Consequently, Respondent's motion for summary judgment lacks a sufficient factual basis.
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is supported by a memorandum with a
"Statement of Facts" in proper form and with clear references to the record of this case.
Petitioner has complied with Rule 4-501 for a supporting memorandum. Petitioner also
styled her memorandum as one opposing Respondent's motion, however, and in this regard
it fails to meet the requirements of Rule 4-501.l If Respondent's memorandum had complied
with the rule, Respondent's statements of fact would have been deemed admitted for
purposes of summary judgment. See, e.g., Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App 291.
Respondent's memorandum in opposition to Petitioner's motion did identify the
paragraphs of Petitioner's statement of facts which Respondent disputes. Respondent's
original formal error was corrected in her post-hearing reply memorandum. The specific
disputes identified in Respondent's memorandum, however, consist mainly of argument and
immaterial facts and are not sufficient to raise any particular genuine issue of material fact.

lr

This is a common problem when partiesfilecompeting motions for summary judgment. In an
effort to be efficient, the parties file dual-purpose memoranda which, in spite of best intentions, are
inevitably inadequate for one purpose or the other. This Court cannot recall ever seeing a memorandum
which adequately constituted both a supporting memorandum and an opposing memorandum.
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Petitioner's reply memorandum correctly notes many of these deficiencies.
As a result, the facts which this Court finds to have been adequately presented are
taken primarily from Petitioner's supporting memorandum, with some additions from
Respondent's reply memorandum.
FACTS
Some of the facts asserted by the parties, and properly supported, are irrelevant to the
Court's decision; for example, the Courtfindsno relevance in the fact that each party paid
for the services of the mortuary hired by that party. The Court finds that the following
relevant and material facts have been established without genuine issue:
1.

Petitioner is the mother of Mr. Curtis Hughes, who died on February 28,2002

in Albuquerque, New Mexico of cyanide poisoning, an apparent suicide.
2.

Respondent is the surviving spouse of Mr. Hughes, and had been married to

him about 11 months before his death.2
3.

On February 12,2002, Mr. Hughes left a voice mail message for Respondent

in which he said he was going to kill himself and that he would like to be cremated and have
his ashes spread over the Rio Grande River.
4.

Mr. Hughes phoned Respondent again about a half hour later, and stated that

2

There was a suggestion in the arguments that Respondent and Mr. Hughes were separated and not
on good terms at the time of his death, but neither party's memorandum established such facts.
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he did not mean what he said; Respondent, who is a mental health professional,3 interpreted
Mr. Hughes's two phone calls to be "a ploy to get attention," such as she commonly
encounters in her profession.
5.

After Mr. Hughes's death on February 28,2002, Respondent hired French's

Mortuary to receive the body from the Medical Examiner's Office in Albuquerque. On
about March 2, 2002, French's Mortuary took charge of the body under Respondent's
instructions to prepare the body and have a funeral service for Mr. Hughes in Albuquerque.
6.

At about the same time, Petitioner hired Metcalf Mortuary to transport the

bodyfromAlbuquerque to St. George, Utah for a second funeral service and the interment
in a burial plot there. Respondent consented to the Utah funeral and interment.
7.

A funeral service was held in Albuquerque on March 5, 2002, after which

Respondent allowed the body to be taken to Utah by Metcalf Mortuary for the second funeral
service and burial, which were conducted on March 8, 2002 and were attended by
Respondent. Respondent gave no indication that she thought the burial in Utah was to be
temporary.
8.

At the time of his death, Mr. Hughes apparently left a note for Petitioner,

making some reference to being cremated and having his ashes spread over the Rio Grande

3

Neither party's statement of facts covers this fact, but the Court has gathered thisfromtheir
discussion.
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River in accordance with his voice mail message to Respondent.4
ANALYSIS
Respondent seeks the Courts order allowing her to have the body disinterred and
transported back to New Mexico for cremation, asserting that she is certain that this was Mr.
Hughes's wish. Respondent apparently relies upon Mr. Hughes's voice mail message, which
she did not believe at the time, and upon Mr. Hughes's note, the contents of which are not
in evidence before the Court.
1. Funeral Services Licensing Act.
Respondent argues that she alone is entitled to determine whether the body will be
disinterred, under the authority of Utah Code Ann. §58-9-602. This statutory provision is
part of the current version of the Funeral Services Licensing Act (hereafter the "Act*') which
first became effective May 5,2003, more than one year after the subject burial, and it now
sets the priorities of persons who are vested with the "right and duty to control the
disposition of a deceased person/' The earlier version of the Act, which was effective at the
time of the subject burial, had no comparable provision.
Respondent argues that the new provisions of the Act should be applied retroactively,
but the Act does not so provide. In the absence of an express declaration of retroactivity,

4

The parties disagree about when Respondent first saw the note, but the Courtfindsthis to be
immaterial to the Court's decision. In fact, neither party has given the Court a copy of the note or the
details of its contents.
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statutes are not to be applied retroactively. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3. Furthermore, the
Court knows of no basis for concluding that the absence of a comparable provision in the
former Act evinces a legislative intention that the new Act be applied retroactively.
Consequently, Respondent's argument is not persuasive.
Furthermore, die Court is not persuaded that Section 602 of the Act would be
controlling in this case even if it applied retroactively. Section 602 specifically controls the
"right and duty to control the disposition of a deceased person." "Disposition" is defined in
the Act as "the final disposal of a dead human body" by any of six specific means or "other
lawful means." Utah Code Ann. §58-9-102(7). Both "earth intermenf' and "cremation" are
defined as means of "disposition," but nothing in the Act indicates that Section 602 gives any
person a continuing or perpetual right to choose more than one disposition of one body.
Consequently, the Court is not persuaded that the serial dispositions sought by Respondent
are authorized by the Act, even in its current form.
2. New Mexico Law.
Respondent argues that the Court should apply the law of New Mexico to determine
that she has a right to disinter the body from Utah and dispose of it in New Mexico. The
argument that New Mexico law gave Respondent rights to the original disposition of the
body would likely have been correct if made before the body was interred in Utah, but now
it is too late. The issue is no longer whether Respondent had such rights regarding

disposition. The issue is whether Respondent can now obtain permission for disinterment
from a grave in Utah, and Utah clearly has the most significant relationship to that issue.
Disinterment of a bodyfroma grave in Utah is a matter for Utah law. See, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. §26-2-17, §26-4-12, and §76-9-704.
3. Waiver of Respondent's Rights.
Petitioner argues that Respondent waived any right to dispose of the body by
cremation when she agreed to the burial in Utah. Respondent counters that she was not
aware of Mr. Hughes's wishes until she learned of his note to Petitioner. Petitioner argues
that Respondent saw the note before the burial, and Respondent argues that she did not. The
Courtfindsthis to be immaterial.
Whatever the contents ofthe note may be, Respondent has not given evidence that the
note creates a binding, enforceable legal obligation to accomplish a cremation. Regardless
of when Respondent learned of Mr. Hughes's note to Petitioner, the note does not create a
legal right in Respondent which she did not already have, if any. The note constitutes simply
(i) another expression of Mr. Hughes' s wishes, contrary to his last expression to Respondent,
and (ii) Respondent's explanation for her change of mind about the burial, whichtireCourt
finds to be a good faith explanation.5 Furthermore, considering Mr. Hughes's vacillation as

Respondent has not explained, however, why she now chooses to believe the note over Mr.
Hughes's statement to her that he did not mean what he had said in his voice mail, or why she should rely
to any extent on the statements of a person whose mental condition had obviously deteriorated to the point
of suicide.

to his wishes, Respondent cannot say that the purported contents of the note were a clear and
unequivocal expression of Mr. Hughes's wishes. Consequently, the note is not material to
the Court's decision.
The fact remains that Mr. Hughes informed Respondent of his wish to be cremated
before his death, and Respondent, in apparent good faim, either chose not to believe him or
chose not to comply with his wishes. Respondent could have chosen to have the body
cremated in accordance with the wishes Mr. Hughes once expressed to her. Having chosen
to allow the body to be buried in Utah, instead of being cremated and disposed of in New
Mexico, Respondent waived any right to choose another form of disposition. Cf. In re Estate
of Mover. 577 P.2d 108 (Utah 1978).
4. Public Policy Regarding Disinterment.
The case just cited states: "It is therefore a sound and well-established policy of the
law that a person, once buried, should not be exhumed except for the most compelling of
reasons." 14. at 110-111. This Court does not read the new provisions of the Funeral
Services Licensing Act to change that policy, since the Act only establishes the priorities of
persons who may chose the method of disposition of a body.
The Mover case was preceded by Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial
Commission. 115 Utah 336, 204 P.2d 811 (Utah 1949), in which the Utah Supreme Court
quoted with approval the following policy language from a Corpus Juris Secondum article:

There is a distinction between therightsexisting prior to burial and those after
burial, because after its interment the body is in the custody of the law and a
disturbance of its resting place and its removal is subject to the control and
direction of a court of equity in any case properly before it It is the policy of
the law, except in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, that the sanctity
of the grave should be maintained, and that a body once suitably buried should
remain undisturbed; and a court will not ordinarily order or permit a body to
be disinterred unless there is a strong showing that it is necessary and that the
interests of justice require it However, there is no universal rule applicable,
each case depending on its own facts and circumstances; and for a valid
reason, upon application by a proper person, the removal of a body will be
permitted.
Id at 813 (emphasis added).
The Mover case was relied upon by the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Spanich v.
Reichelderfer. 628 N.E. 2d 102 (Ohio App. 1993), and that court's expression of the reasons
for the policy restricting disinterments is powerfully persuasive on this issue. The opinion
examines the several factors which courts have considered with respect to requests for
disinterment ofbodies, and this Court has considered those factors in relation to this case and
finds them generally to support Petitioner's arguments. For example, the Court has
considered the following:
a.

While Respondent had the closest legal relationship to Mr. Hughes, it is

suggested (without contradiction) that they were separated at the time of his death, so her
personal interest is weaker than it might have been.
b.

Petitioner's relationship to Mr. Hughes is the closest recognized in the law,

except that of a surviving spouse.

c.

Mr. Hughes's expressions of his wishes were contradictory at best, and his

mental condition was not good at the time, so his trae wishes cannot be determined with any
certainty.
d.

Respondent consented to the burial in Utah, and her suggestion that she was

under pressure from Petitioner is not supported by evidence before the Court.
e.

Respondent acknowledges that she cannot fully comply with what she

considers Mr. Hughes's wishes even if the body is disinterred and cremated, because laws
governing the Rio Grande River would prevent herfromspreading the ashes there.
Ultimately, this Court is not persuaded that Respondent has identified any compelling
reason to order Mr. Hughes's body disinterred.
CONCLUSION
There is no genuine issue of material fact, and Petitioner is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is granted and Respondent's
motion for summary judgment is denied. Accordingly, a permanent injunction shall be
issued, enjoining the disinterment of the body. Petitioners counsel is hereby directed to
submit an appropriate judgment and permanent injunction pursuant to Rule 4-504. A copy
of this Ruling shall be attached to the judgment and incorporated therein by reference.
Dated this ^S> day of October, 2003.

G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE
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